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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate the progress in
nuclear disarmament in the 50 years since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force. Article 6 of the treaty stipulates
the obligation to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. First, this paper
analyzes and evaluates the bilateral treaties signed between the United States
and the Soviet Union or Russia. Second, it analyzes and evaluates the signed
multilateral treaties. Third, it examines the performance and outcome of the
review conferences held every five years to review the operation of the treaty.
Finally, it concludes that although 10 treaties were signed and the number of
strategic offensive arms was substantially reduced, the results were insufficient.
Introduction
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into
force on March 5, 1970. The NPT has three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is a grand bargain
between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. On nuclear
disarmament, Article 6 of the treaty stipulates that each of the parties undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate the progress in nuclear
disarmament in the last 50 years. The main research question is “Has the obligation
under Article 6 of the NPT been implemented?” Since 1970, 10 treaties on nuclear
disarmament, which will be examined here, were signed. The content, parties, and
status of the 10 treaties are all different.
First, this paper will analyze and evaluate the bilateral treaties between the
United States and the Soviet Union or its successor, the Russian Federation, by
dividing them into three categories: SALT, INF, and START negotiations. Second,
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it will analyze and evaluate multilateral treaties: the CTBT and the TPNW. Third,
it will survey the role of the NPT review conferences that have been held every
five years to review the operation of the treaty in implementing the nuclear
disarmament obligations. Finally, it will assess how far nuclear disarmament has
progressed over the last 50 years.
I Bilateral Treaties
1 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
The SALT process was launched by the US president on the day the NPT was
signed, and the negotiations started soon afterward. The first and most critical issue
was how to deal with offensive arms and defensive arms. Based on the theory of
mutual assured destruction (MAD), they agreed first to make the ABM Treaty of
an unlimited duration. This means that without restrictions on defensive arms, it is
impossible to negotiate limitations on offensive arms. This initial agreement was a
particularly good starting point that built a foundation from which further
negotiations on offensive arms would become possible.
There were some background reasons why it was possible to start the SALT
negotiations at that juncture. First, from a strategic point of view, the condition of a
rough parity between the US and the Soviet Union was confirmed. Second, from a
political point of view, Article 6 of the NPT requires the parties to the NPT to
work toward nuclear disarmament. Third, from a technical point of view, the
verification of treaty obligations by satellites became available for them.1)
(1) ABM Treaty
The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems provides in
Article 1 that each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems to defend the
territory of its country. As an exception to this fundamental rule, the treaty permits
each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to
protect an ICBM launch area. This provision was further restricted by permitting
only one of them in the 1974 protocol. In addition, precise quantitative and
qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. The
parties also agreed to limit the qualitative improvement of their ABM technology.
Further, to decrease the pressures of technical change and its unsettling impact on
the strategic balance, the treaty prohibits development, testing, or deployment of
sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems.
1) William C. Foster, “Strategic Weapons: Prospects for Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 47, no.
3 (April 1969): 413.
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The ABM Treaty is considered an exceptionally good starting point for the
future limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, as it would prohibit a further
nuclear arms race that would occur as defensive and offensive arms are
interdependent.
(2) SALT I Interim Agreement
The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms is valid only for five years, and its scope is also limited.
The agreement essentially freezes the number of strategic ballistic missile
launchers at the existing levels. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) is limited to 1,054 for the US and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. The limits
on launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and modern
ballistic missile submarines are 710 SLBM launchers on 44 ballistic missile
submarines for the US and 950 SLBM launchers on 62 modern nuclear-powered
submarines for the Soviet Union.
This is the first provisional step for five years, and both countries have a
strong desire to continue negotiations for further limitations by covering all
strategic offensive arms. The limitations of the agreement are not strict enough
from a military point of view, but from a political point of view, it is a good start
for strengthening strategic stability between the two states.
(3) SALT II Treaty
The SALT II Treaty, whose basic principles were agreed to at the Vladivostok
meeting in November 1974, was signed in June 1979. First, it provides for an equal
aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: ICBM and
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs).
This ceiling was initially set at 2,400 and was to be lowered to 2,250 at the end of
1981.
Second, it has a special limitation on multiple independently-targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs), namely an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of
launchers of MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles,
an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed
ballistic missiles, and an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed
ICBMs.
The limitation on the total number of delivery systems is the ability to
maintain the current level or reduce it to a lower level. However, the limitation of
the MIRVed delivery vehicles is higher than the current level, permitting an
already planned increase.
The significance of the SALT II Treaty is that, first, it includes all three pillars
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of strategic delivery systems, and second, the same numerical limit is imposed on
both countries. Furthermore, it is the first agreement to provide for the reduction of
delivery systems. The Soviet Union must eliminate 254 delivery systems, and the
US must eliminate 33 delivery systems.
However, from the viewpoint of the termination of the nuclear arms race or
nuclear disarmament, as the limitation on the MIRVed systems is set higher than
the current level, the number of MIRVed systems would substantially increase.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute analyzed the situation
thus: “The SALT II Agreement has a relatively small impact on the nuclear forces
of the USA and the USSR. For the most part, the ceiling set by the treaty will
allow the relevant military programmes on both sides to continue with only minor
restrictions.”2)
In January 1980, US president Jimmy Carter asked the Senate to delay the
consideration of the treaty in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a
result, the treaty did not enter into force, but both governments politically abided
by the treaty regulations.
2 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations
In the late 1970s, the INF issue attracted particular attention because the parity
on strategic weapons systems was established between the US and the Soviet
Union, the Soviet Union deployed new and big SS-20 missiles, and the US did not
pay much attention to the security interests of Western European states. In
November 1979, the NATO adopted a “dual track” strategy; one track was to start
arms control negotiations, and the other track was to deploy intermediate-range
nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
In 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev made a joint
statement that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. At the
1986 Reykjavik summit, they agreed to the total elimination of intermediate-range
nuclear forces and the reduction to 6,000 of the warheads of strategic offensive
nuclear weapons. However, President Reaganʼs insistence on pursuing the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) prevented such agreements from being independently
agreed upon.
On December 8, 1987, they signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. It requires the destruction within three years of both sidesʼ ground-
2) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and
Disarmament 1980, 240.
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launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500–5,500 km, their launchers,
and associated support structures and support equipment. The number of destroyed
missiles is 866 for the US and 1,752 for the Soviet Union, and the number of
destroyed missile launchers is 283 for the US and 845 for the Soviet Union. The
treaty also provides extremely strict verification measures mainly based on on-site
inspection. It entered into force on June 1, 1988, and was completely implemented
within three years.
From a military point of view, this treaty eliminated intermediate-range
missiles, rather than limiting them as the SALT agreements did. It had significant
importance from a political point of view, by changing the nature of US-Soviet
relations from confrontation to cooperation, producing détente in the international
community, and leading to the end of the Cold War.
3 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
(1) START Treaty
President Reagan expressed his intention to negotiate a deep reduction in the
number of strategic arms and called these negotiations the “Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks” (START) in November 1981. Although nuclear and space
negotiations started in March 1985, the two sides were not able to sign the treaty
during the Reagan administration.
The new administration of President George H. W. Bush signed the START
Treaty with President Gorbachev on July 31, 1991. Article II sets forth the central
limits: 1,600 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, including 154
deployed heavy ICBMs; 6,000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
and heavy bombers; 4,900 attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs; 1,100 attributed to
mobile ICBMs; and 1,540 attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. It also provides
extremely strict measures for verification, including 13 types of on-site inspection.
To take into account the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Lisbon Protocol was
signed by the US, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus on
May 23, 1992. Then the START Treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994.
This is the first treaty to substantially reduce nuclear warheads as well as
nuclear delivery systems with strict verification measures. As the first step towards
nuclear reduction, this treaty occupies a key position.
(2) START II Treaty
On January 3, 1993, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the START
II Treaty, which required them to reduce their nuclear delivery systems and
warheads by January 1, 2003. Article I provides for the reduction in two stages to a
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level of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads attributable to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers. Within such limitations, SLBMs are limited to 1,750, MIRVed
ICBMs are limited to zero, and heavy ICBMs are limited to zero. Article II
provides for the elimination or conversion of all MIRVed ICBMs to single-
warhead ICBMs.
The significance of the treaty is that, first, it provides for the substantial
reduction of warheads by two-thirds as it counts the real number of warheads, and
second, it provides for the total elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.
At the summit meeting in March 1997, in a joint statement, President Clinton
and President Yeltsin agreed that they would start negotiations of the START III
Treaty when the START II Treaty entered into force, and they would agree to reduce
the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000–2,500 by December 31, 2007.
One of the critical issues that prevented the treatyʼs ratification by Russia was
the development of theater missile defense (TMD) by the US. There were some
agreed statements between the two states, and the Duma decided to ratify the
treaty. However, in the end, the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty prevented it
from entering into force. As a result, there were no negotiations on the START III
Treaty.
(3) SORT Treaty
In 2001, US President George W. Bush argued that it was necessary to go
over the ABM Treaty and deeply reduce nuclear weapons unilaterally. At the
summit meeting with President Putin, he offered to reduce the number of US
strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next
decade. As President Putin asked that the agreement be made into a treaty,
President Bush agreed to codify his pledge in a formal legally binding agreement.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) was signed on May 4, 2002.
Article 1 states that each party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear
warheads, so that by December 31, 2012, the aggregate number of such warheads
does not exceed 1,700–2,200 for each party.
This formal international treaty legally binds the two parties. However, the
content of the obligations is expressed only in Article 1. There is no common
definition of nuclear warheads, while each side uses a different definition. There is
no rule for counting nuclear warheads. There is no provision for verification. The
US understands that this treaty is what the US intended to do unilaterally. The
treaty lacks the indispensable elements for disarmament, which are irreversibility,
verifiability, and transparency.
The SORT Treaty is dealt with here for convenience as it regulates strategic
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offensive arms, but the treaty is independent from and not included in the START
process.
(4) New Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (New START)
President Obama and President Medvedev held the first summit meeting in
April 2009 and agreed to start negotiations on the further reduction of strategic
offensive arms. On April 9, 2010, they signed the Treaty on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START
Treaty).
Under Article II, each party shall reduce and limit delivery systems and
warheads as provided below, so that seven years after the entry into force of this
treaty, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:
(a) 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers;
(b) 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs,
and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
(c) 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-
deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy
bombers.
Compared with the START Treaty, the deployed delivery systems are reduced
from 1,600 to 700, and the warheads are reduced from 6,000 to 1,550.
The treaty provides for the two types of on-site inspection. Each party shall
have the right to conduct Type One inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases,
and air bases. The purpose is to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the
numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic arms and number of
warheads. It can be performed 10 times a year.
Type Two inspections shall be conducted at various facilities to confirm the
accuracy of the declared data of non-deployed strategic offensive arms. These
inspections can be performed eight times a year.
The first significant feature of the treaty is that nuclear disarmament
negotiations have returned to a central place in international politics. Ivan Oelrich
states, “Whatever the actual reductions mandated by the treaty—and they are
modest—it was vital to get the United States and Russia talking about nuclear
weapons again.”3)
The second significant feature is the content of the treaty: a 30 percent
3) Ivan Oelrich, “Hardly a Jump START,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 29, 2010. http:
//www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/hardly-a-jump-start.php
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reduction of nuclear warheads, and a deep reduction of delivery systems from the
level of the START Treaty. The third element is that it provides for strict
verification and inspection measures, and the fourth is that the US and Russia show
evidence that they are implementing the obligations of Article 6 of the NPT.
Steven Pifer states that the new START Treaty offers significant benefits for
US national security, noting that (i) it reduces the potential threat and makes the
US more secure, (ii) the treaty provides transparency and predictability regarding
Russian strategic forces, (iii) the US reduces them but maintains a strong and
effective deterrent; (iv) the new treaty will bolster the basic bargaining of the NPT,
(v) it contributes to resetting relations with Russia, and (vi) it sets the stage for
further reductions.4)
4 Evaluation of the Bilateral Negotiations
(1) Strategic Offensive Arms
The negotiations of the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms
have been conducted continuously through the negotiations of the SALT I Interim
Agreement, the SALT II Treaty, the START Treaty, the START II Treaty, and the
New START Treaty for nearly 50 years. This record of continuous negotiations of
the SALT/START process should be praised and highly valued. In particular, the
SALT process was transferred to the START process, and the START process
reduced the number of warheads for the US and Russia from about 12,000 for each
to 1,550 for each after the end of the Cold War.
This process succeeded in substantively reducing the number of strategic
offensive arms. Although the SALT II Treaty did not enter into force because of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the START II Treaty did not enter into
force because of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the process continued,
as the parties followed the regulations and the next steps were agreed upon later.
The current issue of the extension of the New START Treaty is critical for the
future course of nuclear disarmament and will affect the future of further
reductions of strategic offensive arms. Russia argues that the treaty should be
extended for five years, as provided for in the treaty. On the other hand, the US
Trump administration originally argued for new conditions, namely that China
should join the negotiations, thus making them tripartite negotiations. After
meeting with strong opposition from China, the US withdrew this condition. Then
4) Steven Pifer, “New START: Good News for U.S. Security,” Arms Control Today 40, no. 4
(May 2010): 8–14.
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the US introduced new conditions stating that the negotiations should include non-
strategic nuclear weapons and should include more stringent verification measures.
However, new President Joseph Biden will agree to extent the treaty, as he
have strongly supported the extension of the treaty during his Presidential
campaign.
(2) Strategic Defensive Arms
The first treaty concluded under the SALT/START process was concerned
with strategic defensive arms, that is, the ABM Treaty. The preamble of the treaty
considers that “effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to
a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.”
The entry into force of the ABM Treaty was an extremely useful and effective
measure for the strategic stability between the two states and the realization of
mutual assured destruction theory. As a result, this treaty should be highly valued
as a starting point for the subsequent SALT/START process.
During the bilateral negotiations in the late 1980s, General Secretary
Gorbachev flatly refused to accept President Reaganʼs SDI, although they agreed to
a strategic arms reduction, which was later signed as the START Treaty.
Accordingly, President George W. Bushʼs decision to unilaterally withdraw
from the ABM Treaty in 2002 seems to have been a serious miscalculation that
stopped the START process and invited an intense nuclear arms race. In fact,
Russia prevented the entry into force of the START II Treaty, although Russia had
ratified it. Then the START process was forced to stop for a while.
The New START Treaty of 2011 also emphasizes the interrelationship
between offensive and defensive arms, as the preamble recognizes “the existence of
the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms,
and that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms
are reduced.”
Even now, President Putin states, “The withdrawal of the United States from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 forced Russia to start developing hypersonic
weapons. We had to create these weapons in response to the deployment of the US
strategic missile defense systems, which was capable of actually neutralizing our
entire nuclear potential in the future.”5)
5) “Putin Says Russia Had to Create Hypersonic Weapons after USʼ Pullout from ABM
Treaty,” Newsdesk, September 19, 2020. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/putin-says-
russia-had-to-create-hypersonic-weapons-after-us-pullout-from-abm-treaty
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The unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by President Bush in
2002 still has extraordinarily strong repercussions. The fundamental policy on
which Bush depended was “unilateralism.” This means that the US will do
whatever it wants, with no regard to the opinion of other states and taking into
consideration only its own short-term, selfish interests.
Trump argued for an “America First” policy, which was quite similar to
Bushʼs “unilateralism.” Presidents Trump and Bush have both rejected international
interests, international cooperation, international law, and international
organizations, and have pursued national interests in a short-sighted way.
Furthermore, Trump also advocated much stronger military forces, particularly a
new and wide-ranging space policy that he says would intercept and destroy any
coming missile, including ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. It will only
encourage nuclear arms races that need to be stopped as soon as possible.
(3) INF Treaty
The bilateral relations between the US and the Soviet Union in the early
1980s were sharply confrontational, as the US deployed many intermediate-range
nuclear missiles in Western Europe to achieve parity with the Soviet Union. Since
1985, General Secretary Gorbachev radically changed the Soviet Unionʼs domestic
policies and changed its international policies from confrontation to cooperation.
President Reagan also adopted an attitude of cooperation. This was an important
factor in the conclusion of the INF Treaty.
The two sides could not agree on the SDI program that President Reagan
strongly clung to. However, they agreed to separate the two issues, so the INF
Treaty was signed. The other reason for success came from Soviet concessions in
some parts, including the type of weapons that were to be included, the number of
missiles that were to be destroyed, and the area where the treaty was to be applied.
This historical event became possible because the two leaders were sincerely
willing to cooperate in reducing nuclear weapons. Gorbachev in particular
introduced new ideas such as perestroika and his new international policy with
cooperation and concessions.
The INF Treaty was an epochal event that transformed international relations,
particularly between the US and the Soviet Union, from confrontation to détente
and cooperation. This was one of the most important events that ended the Cold
War era.
From not only the military but also the political point of view, the INF Treaty
should be highly valued for its contribution to international peace and security,
including the total elimination of a class of nuclear weapons and the introduction
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of the post-Cold War era. In three years, as provided for in the treaty, all
intermediate-range missiles were destroyed.
Thirty years later, the Trump administration decided to withdraw unilaterally
from the treaty on the grounds that Russia was developing and deploying the
missiles that were prohibited under the treaty. Russia accused the US of violating
the INF Treaty, as the Aegis Ashore system deployed in Europe could be easily
changed to offensive intermediate-range missiles.
Unfortunately, the US made the statement on withdrawal without consulting
with Russia, and now is developing and deploying missiles that were prohibited
under the INF Treaty. Russia is also responsible for this outcome, as Russia did not
respond positively to US criticism of Russiaʼs violation. Relations between the two
states are now confrontational in all aspects. One of the reasons is that the Trump
administration behaves based on the principle of “America First,” which means the
US pursues its short-sighted national interest and abandons international interests
and cooperation through international law or international organizations.
II Multilateral Treaties
1 CTBT
The start of the negotiations of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty) has been one of the most important measures to implement the obligations
set down in Article 6 of the NPT since its entry into force. The CTBT was the
most important measure during the discussions at the first four NPT review
conferences from 1975 to 1990.
The negotiations of the CTBT started in 1994 because the Cold War ended
around 1990, and the 1995 NPT review conference had to decide how to extend
the duration of the NPT. The states in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) argued
that signing the CTBT was a precondition for the indefinite extension of the NPT,
and the nuclear-weapon states recognized that some progress in nuclear
disarmament was necessary to realize the indefinite extension.
At the 1995 NPT review conference, the completion of the negotiations on
CTBT no later than 1996 was agreed upon as one of the disarmament measures as
a package deal with the decision to indefinitely extend the treaty.
During the negotiations, issues were discussed such as nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes, tests for safety and reliability, hydronuclear tests, the
preparation of tests, the closure of test sites, and tests without an explosion. The
president of the conference submitted a draft treaty in May 1996 for the first time,
Article 1 of which provides for the following (which was later adopted in the
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CTBT):
Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to prohibit and prevent any
such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control6).
The basic obligation of the CTBT is to prohibit nuclear weapon test
explosions or any other nuclear explosion comprehensively and in any place. The
treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO) to achieve the objectives and purposes of this treaty and ensure the
implementation of its provisions. The CTBTO consists of the Conference of the
State Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The verification
regime consists of the international monitoring system, consultation and
clarification, and on-site inspection. On-site inspection will be conducted with
affirmative votes of 30 states among 51 members of the Executive Council.
The CTBT enters into force according to a unique method. The nuclear-
weapon states generally considered the treaty to be a non-proliferation measure
rather than a nuclear disarmament measure. They then decided that ratification by
Israel, India, and Pakistan should be indispensable for the entry into force of the
treaty. As a result, the treaty lists 44 states that are members of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) and possess a power reactor or research reactor and must ratify
the treaty for it to enter into force. On the other hand, the NAM states argued that
the CTBT must deal with both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
2 TPNW
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was signed at the
UN conference on July 7, 2017. The two main elements that promoted treaty
negotiations were the adoption of a humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament
and the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament with nuclear arms race among
nuclear-weapon states. The TPNW is different from other nuclear disarmament
treaties in the way that it was made. The negotiations were started mainly by non-
nuclear-weapon states at the United Nations conference, which bases its decisions
on a majority vote. Usually, negotiations are conducted by the initiative of the
nuclear-weapon states and based on the rule of consensus.
The concept of security under the treaty is different from the traditional one.
In traditional thinking, security refers to the national and military security of each
6) Chairman of the ad hoc Committee of a Nuclear Test Ban, Working Paper, Draft
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, CD/NTB/WP.330, 28 May 1996.
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state. However, the security under the TPNW is comprehensive security for all
humanity, which means it includes not only military but also human, humanitarian,
environmental, and other types of security.
In December 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that
“decides to convene in 2017 a United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally
binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination.”
In the first session in March, the participants mainly discussed the principles
and objectives that were to be included in the preamble and the fundamental
obligations on actions that were to be prohibited. In the second session in June and
July, the negotiations continued with the president of the conference presenting
some draft treaties. On July 7, the draft treaty7) was adopted, with 122 states
supporting, one opposing, and one abstaining.
Under the treaty, each state party undertakes never under any circumstance to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, or
stockpile nuclear weapons;
(b) Transfer nuclear weapons;
(c) Receive nuclear weapons;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons;
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce to engage in any activities prohibited;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance to engage in any activities prohibited;
(g) Allow any stationing of nuclear weapons in its territory.
The treaty, if compared with the contents of the obligations of the NPT,
prohibits the use or the threat of using nuclear weapons or the stationing of nuclear
weapons on oneʼs territory. It prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons, which is a
much wider mandate than the CTBT, which prohibits only nuclear weapons test
explosions.
The principal obligation of the treaty is the “prohibition” of certain activities
concerning nuclear weapons, but it does not provide for the “destruction” or
“elimination” of nuclear weapons directly. The treaty entered into force on January
22, 2021, 90 days after 50 states ratified the treaty.
7) Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/8, June 7, 2017. https://
www.undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8
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3 Evaluation of the Multilateral Treaties
(1) CTBT
The CTBT was signed in September 1996 following the decision at the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference. It should be praised as an event of historic
importance for nuclear disarmament. Since then, none of the nuclear-weapons
states—the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France,
and China—have conducted nuclear test explosions. Three of them, excluding the
US and China, have ratified the treaty. The US and China should work for the
ratification of the treaty.
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, non-NPT
states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea have conducted nuclear tests. Thus
it can be said that the CTBTʼs mission of non-proliferation has not succeeded.
The fact that the CTBT has been signed by many states, including all nuclear-
weapon states, should be highly valued, because even a signatory state is obliged to
refrain from the acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
However, achieving the entry into force of this treaty is a challenge, especially
compared to other disarmament-related treaties. For the treaty to enter into force,
all 44 states listed in Annex II must ratify it. At present, the United States, China,
India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, and North Korea have not ratified it.
Accomplishing this in the near future would be extremely difficult. First, the US
should ratify it, and then China should follow. Second, the security situation in
South Asia must be improved before India and Pakistan will sign and ratify it.
Third, the Middle East must be more peaceful before Israel, Egypt, and Iran will
ratify it. Finally, peace on the Korean Peninsula is necessary before North Korea
will sign and ratify it.
(2) TPNW
The TPNW entered into force in January 2021, when 50 states ratified it, and
became a legally binding rule of international law.
The key aspect of the treaty is the division and confrontation between its
supporters and opponents. Treaty negotiations were initiated and conducted by non-
nuclear-weapon states, whose security does not depend on nuclear weapons. The
opponents are the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states whose
security depends on nuclear weapons, that is, so-called “nuclear umbrella states.”
The first criticism of the opponents is that the treaty serves no purpose, as the
nuclear-weapons states would not join the treaty, and not even one nuclear weapon
would be reduced. Second, this treaty is not acceptable because it has never taken
into account the national security dimension. The third is that the treaty jeopardizes
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the NPT and the NPT regime, which is the linchpin of international peace and
security.
The response by the proponents to the first point is that the purpose of the
treaty is not to reduce the number of nuclear weapons but to stigmatize and
delegitimatize them in the longer term. The response to the second point is that the
supporters argue for a wider sense of security, including the security of humanity,
which is the existence of humanity itself. The response to the third point is that the
treaty itself is the implementation of the obligation under Article 6 of the NPT.
Divisions and confrontation mainly arise from the differences in the approach
to nuclear disarmament. The opponents support the traditional approach, which
emphasizes national and military security and strategic stability. However,
proponents argue for the humanitarian approach, which emphasizes the existence of
humanity itself.
In addition, opponents oppose and reject the TPNW, but proponents do not
oppose and reject the NPT and other existing treaties. The argument by opponents
is exclusive, but the argument by proponents is inclusive. The two approaches are
not necessarily confrontational, and the two approaches should be pursued in
parallel in the interest of progress in nuclear disarmament.
However, the traditional approach has not produced either a new bilateral
treaty in almost 10 years or a new multilateral treaty in almost 25 years.
From this practical point of view, the conclusion of TPNW should be highly
appreciated. Although it entered into force, the work is not complete; its supporters
need to keep trying to increase the number of treaty parties and sway public
opinion to change government attitudes.
(3) Other Multilateral Treaties
Only two multilateral treaties exist. The TPNW entered into force, but the
CTBT will not in the near future, although almost 25 years have passed since it
was adopted and signed. This situation is deeply regrettable from the viewpoint of
the implementation of Article 6 of the NPT during the last 50 years.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference cites the following three
measures as important for the full realization and effective implementation of
Article 6:
(a) The completion of the negotiations on the CTBT no later than 1996.
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
(c) The determined pursuit of efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.
The CTBT was concluded, and efforts to reduce nuclear weapons have been
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pursued, but the negotiations on a FMCT have made no progress. The main reason
for this is that Pakistan has strongly opposed the start of the negotiations at the CD,
where all issues, including the procedural ones concerning matters such as whether
to start negotiations, are to be decided by consensus. This means that each state has
veto power. The problem here is not only the voting system at the CD but also the
fact that there have not been many efforts to look for other options to start
negotiations.
For example, in the case of the CTBT negotiations at the CD, as India
opposed the draft treaty, the CD could not adopt it because of the consensus rule.
However, Australia submitted the same draft treaty to the United Nations for the
negotiations, although it was irregular. The UN General Assembly discussed the
draft treaty and adopted it by a majority vote, according to the rules of the UN
General Assembly. This means that the alternative method was pursued, and the
treaty was formally adopted.
The lesson here is that although in the case of nuclear-disarmament-related
treaties, it is preferable to decide by consensus, we should look for other methods
by which to adopt a treaty. Methods without a consensus rule have a higher
possibility of resulting in a successful adoption of a FMCT. The TPNW was
adopted by a majority rule at the UN Conference despite strong opposition from
the nuclear-weapon states and other states under the nuclear umbrella who refused
to participate in the negotiations.
III NPT Review Conferences
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the NPT provides that a conference of parties shall
be held in order to review the operation of this treaty with a view to assuring that
the purposes of the preamble and the provisions are being realized. At the 1995
review conference, this review process was strengthened. The review conference
should be held every five years for four weeks. The preparatory committee should
hold for two weeks in each of the three years prior to the review conference, and
the review conference should look forward as well as back.
The fact that such a long time is allotted for the review process reflects the
fact that its process is extremely important for international peace and security, and
every issue should be discussed here. The conference consists of three main
committees: the first committee for nuclear disarmament, the second committee for
non-proliferation, and the third committee for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Nine review conferences have been held so far, and the three conferences can
be said to have succeeded in agreeing on final documents in 1995, 2000, and 2010.
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1 1975–1990 Review Conferences
At the review conferences during the first 20 years when the ABM Treaty and
the SALT I Interim Agreement were ratified, the SALT II Treaty was signed, and
the INF Treaty was ratified, the US and the Soviet Union stated that they were
making efforts toward nuclear disarmament, and they argued that they were
implementing their obligations under Article 6 in good faith.
However, the non-nuclear-weapon states, particularly the NAM states, argued
very strongly for beginning CTBT negotiations early. The nuclear-weapon states
refused to start it. CTBT has been the most critical issue at these conferences. The
attitude of both sides was very confrontational. This is the main reason why the
first four review conferences did not yield any positive results.
2 1995 Review Conference
In the first half of the 1990s, the START Treaty entered into force, the
START II Treaty was signed, and the CTBT negotiations started, following the end
of the Cold War. The 1995 conference was not only a review conference but also
an extension conference to decide how to extend the NPT.
The conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely as a package with the
adoption of the two documents. One is “Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty,” and the other is “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament.” In addition, the conference adopted a resolution on the Middle
East.8)
The document on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament includes seven topics: universality, non-proliferation, nuclear
disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
On nuclear disarmament, it provides that the achievement of the following
measures is important for the full realization and effective implementation of
Article 6:
(a) The completion of the negotiations on a universal, internationally, and
effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996
(b) Immediate commencement and early conclusion on the negotiations on a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention on a FMCT
8) NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 1), 1995, 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Final
Document Part 1. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/N95/176/PDF/N9517816.
pdf?OpenElement
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(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons.
The conference succeeded in strengthening the legal basis of non-
proliferation by extending the treaty indefinitely. On the other hand, the
disarmament aspect was settled by the political agreement to make efforts for it,
although non-nuclear-weapon states had argued for the strong connection between
the decision of the extension and the strict obligations on nuclear disarmament.
3 2000 Review Conference
The CTBT was adopted in 1996, but negotiations on a FMCT did not start,
and no progress was made in the reduction of nuclear weapons. There was no
progress in the START process, and the US Senate rejected the ratification of the
CTBT.
At the conference, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), consisting of Ireland,
Sweden, New Zealand, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, played a central
role in nuclear disarmament in place of the NAM. The NACʼs proposal was more
realistic than the NAMʼs. It argued that the nuclear-weapon states should make an
unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons
and take measures that lead to nuclear disarmament.
The conference agreed to the following practical measures:
1. Signatures and ratification of the CTBT
2 A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosion
3 Negotiations of a FMCT
4 Establishment of a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament
5 Application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament
6 An unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
weapons
7 The early entry into force of START II
8 The completion of the Trilateral Initiative
9 Steps leading to nuclear disarmament: (i) unilateral reduction of nuclear
arsenals, (ii) increased transparency, (iii) further reduction of non-
strategic nuclear weapons, (iv) reduction of operational status, (v) a
diminishing role of nuclear weapons, (vi) engagement of all nuclear-
weapon states in the disarmament process.
10 Disposition of fissile material that is no longer necessary
11 General and complete disarmament
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12 Regular report on the implementation of nuclear disarmament
13 The further development of verification capabilities
The 2000 review conference should be highly valued, as it succeeded in
adopting the final document by consensus, which included a review of the previous
five years on the progress of nuclear disarmament and the measures that needed to
be implemented in the coming five years.
4 2005 Review Conference
The US under the Bush administration fervently supported unilateralism
instead of multilateralism and ignored international cooperation, international law,
and international organizations. In the field of nuclear disarmament, the US
strongly opposed the CTBT and unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty.
The conference could not agree on the agenda for two-and-a-half weeks,
mainly because the US refused to refer to the undertakings at the previous review
conferences, in particular the undertakings agreed at the 2000 review conference,
including an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
weapons.
As a result of this US attitude, the conference could not agree on anything,
and it was generally regarded as a complete failure. The president of the
conference, Sergio Duarte, stated, “I am very worried about the future and
credibility of the NPT, considering the general trend away from multilateralism. If
commitments undertaken by states parties under the NPT, regarding both
nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, continue to be perceived as ignored or
disregarded, and if there is no common, overriding interest in upholding the treaty,
or if states parties come to believe that their security interests are no longer served
by the NPT, then the prospects for the treaty look dire indeed.”9)
5 2010 Review Conference
President Obama stated in April 2009 that he would pursue a world without
nuclear weapons, and in April 2010 the New START Treaty was signed. The 2010
review conference was held in this promising atmosphere and succeeded in
agreeing on a final document.
The part of the conclusion and the recommendations for follow-on actions
dealing with nuclear disarmament includes 22 actions in the following six
9) John du Preez and Sergio Duarte, “Keeping the NPT Together: A Thankless Job in a Climate
of Mistrust,” Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 1 (March 2006): 13.
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categories: (a) principles and objectives, (b) disarmament of nuclear weapons, (c)
security assurances, (d) nuclear testing, (e) fissile materials, and (f) other measures
in support of nuclear disarmament.
The concrete measures recommended there are reductions in nuclear weapons,
early entry into force and full implementation of the New START Treaty, concrete
progress on the concrete measures contained in the 2000 final document,
ratification of the CTBT, the immediate start of a FMCT, and others.
Alison Kelly states that the outcome is a forward-looking 22-point action plan
on nuclear disarmament. She says that its important recommendation to previous
undertakings on nuclear disarmament and concrete steps are welcome and that the
action plan represents a significant step forward for the NPT regime.10)
However, Shannon Kile is skeptical that substantive success was achieved,
stating, “The NAM states parties were particularly critical of what they saw as the
failure of the NWS to make sufficient progress towards fulfilling their
commitment, codified in Article 6 of the Treaty, to work towards nuclear
disarmament.”11)
The conference is considered to have been a success, as it was able to adopt a
part of the future action plan by consensus. However, it cannot be denied that the
contents of the action plans were weakened to reach consensus, and many of the
actions mentioned were a repetition of the 2000 final document.
6 2015 Review Conference
The circumstances surrounding the conference were unfavorable: there were
no nuclear disarmament negotiations because of the general deterioration of US-
Russia relations, nuclear-weapon states were modernizing their arsenals, and Russia
was increasing the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy.
One of the central issues in the arguments at the conference was the
introduction of a humanitarian approach towards nuclear disarmament. The joint
statement prepared by Austria with 159 states argued that (1) awareness of the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and
efforts towards nuclear disarmament, (2) it is in the interest of the very survival of
humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances, and
(3) the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is
10) Allison Kelly, “NPT: Back on Track,” Arms Control Today 40, no. 6 (July/August 2010): 23.
11) Shannon N. Kile, “Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,” SIPRI Yearbook 2011:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2011), 381.
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through their total elimination.12)
The other joint statement, prepared by Australia with 26 states, argued that (1)
the signatories stress the significance of spreading awareness of the humanitarian
impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations, (2) eliminating nuclear
weapons is possible only through substantive and constructive engagement with
those states that possess nuclear weapons, and (3) to create the conditions for
nuclear disarmament requires the global community to cooperate to address the
important security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.13)
The paragraph 1 of the final draft document states the following:
The Conference emphasizes that deep concerns pertaining to the
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons
are a key factor that should continue to underpin efforts in the field of
nuclear disarmament, and that awareness of these consequences should
lend urgency to efforts by all states leading to a world without nuclear
weapons. The Conference affirms that, pending the realization of this
objective, it is in the interest of humanity and the security of all people
that nuclear weapons never be used again14).
The content of the final draft document on nuclear disarmament mostly
repeats the 2010 final document without great progress. The content of the first
four drafts included new nuclear disarmament measures, but they were watered
down in order to adopt the opinions of the nuclear-weapon states to achieve
consensus. Despite these processes, there seemed to be general agreement
concerning the part about nuclear disarmament in the final draft document.
However, on the last day of the conference, the final draft document as a
whole could not be accepted by consensus; the US, the UK, and Canada expressed
opposition to it on the grounds that they could not agree to a zone in the Middle
East free of weapons of mass destruction.
Jayanta Dhanapala and Sergio Duarte state, “The long-standing efforts of the
international community to forge a realistic, sensible path to achieve nuclear
disarmament seem to have hit a dead end. Unless the gap between promises and
12) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Austria, Joint Statement on the
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 28 April 2015. https://www.un.org/conf/
npt/2015/statement/pdf/humanitarian_en.pdf
13) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Australia, Joint Statement on
the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 30 April 2015. https://www.un.org/en/
conf/npt/2015/statement/pdf/HCG_en.pdf
14) 2015NPT Review Conference, Draft Final Document, Volume I, NPT/CONF.2015/R.3
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effective measures is filled, the legitimacy, authority, and appeal of the NPT will
inexorably wane.”15)
IV Conclusion
This paper attempts to evaluate, 50 years after the NPT entered into force, to
what extent the obligations under Article 6 of the NPT have actually been
implemented in international relations. For the last 50 years, negotiations on
nuclear disarmament have been conducted intermittently, and as a result, 10 treaties
were signed.
It is remarkable that so many treaties have been signed. However, three of the
10 treaties have never been ratified and have not entered into force. In addition,
two can no longer take effect, as the implementation date has passed. The CTBT
has no prospect of entering into force, although 25 years have passed since it was
signed.
It is deeply regrettable that the US has unilaterally withdrawn from the two
ratified bilateral treaties. One is President Bushʼs withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
in 2002, and the other is President Trumpʼs withdrawal from the INF Treaty in
2018. Bushʼs slogan was “Unilateralism,” and Trumpʼs slogan was “America
First.” The two presidents have both pursued a strictly defined national interest that
is short-sighted and strongly opposed international interest, international law,
international organizations, and international cooperation.
Six of the 10 treaties deal with strategic offensive arms between the US and
the Soviet Union or Russia. Although two of them did not enter into force, these
six treaties should be treated as one continuous long-term process. Under the SALT
negotiations, the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty provided for
the limitation or freeze of the offensive arms. Under the START negotiations, the
number of warheads has been reduced from 12,000 to 6,000, 3,000–3,500, 1,700–2,
200, and finally, 1,550. These processes should be highly appreciated for their
continuous reduction of strategic nuclear offensive warheads. The SORT Treaty
should not be understood as being included in the START process. Rather, the
basic agreement of the START III Treaty should be considered.
The START process has succeeded in reducing the number of nuclear
warheads for nearly 30 years. However, under the Trump administration, the
process risks encountering discontinuity, as the New START will expire on
15) Jayantha Dhanapala and Sergio Duarte, “Is There a Future for the NPT?” Arms Control
Today 45, no. 6 (July/August 2015): 10.
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February 5, 2021, unless the two parties agree to extend it.
New US President Joseph Biden have argued for the extension of the treaty
during the Presidential campaign, and it is expected that the treaty will be extended
for five years and new negotiations on the further reduction of strategic arms
between the US and Russia will soon start.
It is the good news that recently the TPNW entered into force, but the division
and confrontation between the supporters and the opponents will continue. The
supporters must work hard to increase the contracting states of the treaty and make
it more universal.
Article 6 stipulates the effective measures relating to cessation of arms race
“at an early date,” but arms race have not terminated even now. Recently the arms
race between the US and Russia as well as between the US and China is getting
harsh. They are all modernizing their offensive and defensive arms. As a
qualitative measure for the cessation of arms race, the CTBT was concluded but
has not entered into force, and as a quantitative measure, a FMCT has not seriously
negotiated yet.
This is the final analysis of the current progress in nuclear disarmament during
the last 50 years. In summary, the situation remains highly unsatisfactory.
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